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ince 2007, mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures increased significantly with the deterioration in the U.S. housing market. Among other factors, a high unemployment rate has contributed to this landscape by reducing borrowers' incomes, and a persistently high rate will continue to have negative effects. However, some recent developments, including a sharp decline in long-term delinquencies, suggest that there may be an end in sight for the foreclosure woes.
The chart shows data from the past decade: serious delinquencies (more than 90 days), foreclosure starts (when lenders have started foreclosure proceedings), and foreclosure inventory (completed foreclosures). During the 2001 recession, the delinquency rate and foreclosure inventory increased somewhat. In the most recent episode, from the start of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007, delinquencies have increased fivefold, as both the number of households entering delinquency and the average duration of that delinquency have increased. 1 Yet, the number of foreclosure starts has become more volatile and has actually not kept pace with the number of seriously delinquent mortgages.
Ultimately, the national foreclosure rate doesn't depend solely on the borrower's ability to pay. Lenders' willingness to negotiate also affects the end result, as do their incentives and legal obligations.
When a borrower defaults on a loan, the lender has the choice to foreclose, but foreclosure is a complex process that varies by state: Borrowers must be notified of impending foreclosure, usually three to six months after the first missed payment. And, depending on the state, foreclosure actions may be judicial, which requires court approval, or non-judicial, which is an administrative matter independent of the courts.
In addition, lenders have found it difficult to handle the recent volume of foreclosures. Many mortgage lenders and servicers have placed moratoria on foreclosure proceedings after defective procedures were discovered; perhaps most visible was the "robo-signing" scandal in which bank employees processed thousands of foreclosure documents without evaluating their accuracy. For a limited number of borrowers, government programs have reduced foreclosures, although many analysts are skeptical these programs have had a significant effect. 2 A final observation concerns the cost of foreclosure. Contrary to popular perception, the foreclosure process can be very costly for a lender. A number of states have anti-deficiency laws that prevent the lender from recovering the difference between the final (post-foreclosure) sale price and the outstanding balance of the mortgage. An alternative for the lender is to renegotiate the loan, a process that often is less costly than outright foreclosure-by some estimates, there is a sevenfold difference between modification write-offs and foreclosure losses. 3 Therefore, it remains a puzzle as to why such large numbers of mortgages in default enter into foreclosure in the first place.
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CPI Inflation and 1-Year-Ahead CPI Inflation Expectations
The shaded region shows the Humphrey-Hawkins CPI inflation range. Beginning in January 2000, the Humphrey-Hawkins inflation range was reported using the PCE price index and therefore is not shown on this graph. 
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Dashed lines indicate 10-year moving averages. MZM (money, zero maturity): M2 minus small-denomination time deposits, plus institutional money market mutual funds (that is, those included in M3 but excluded from M2). The label MZM was coined by William Poole (1991) ; the aggregate itself was proposed earlier by Motley (1988) .
M2: M1 plus savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts) and small-denomination (under $100,000) time deposits issued by financial institutions; and shares in retail money market mutual funds (funds with initial investments under $50,000), net of retirement accounts.
M3:
M2 plus large-denomination ($100,000 or more) time deposits; repurchase agreements issued by depository institutions; Eurodollar deposits, specifically, dollar-denominated deposits due to nonbank U.S. addresses held at foreign offices of U.S. banks worldwide and all banking offices in Canada and the United Kingdom; and institutional money market mutual funds (funds with initial investments of $50,000 or more).
Bank Credit: All loans, leases, and securities held by commercial banks.
Domestic Nonfinancial Debt:
Total credit market liabilities of the U.S. Treasury, federally sponsored agencies, state and local governments, households, and nonfinancial firms. End-of-period basis.
Adjusted Monetary Base:
The sum of currency in circulation outside Federal Reserve Banks and the U.S. Treasury, deposits of depository financial institutions at Federal Reserve Banks, and an adjustment for the effects of changes in statutory reserve requirements on the quantity of base money held by depositories. This series is a spliced chain index; see Anderson and Rasche (1996a ,b, 2001 , 2003 .
Adjusted Reserves:
The sum of vault cash and Federal Reserve Bank deposits held by depository institutions and an adjustment for the effects of changes in statutory reserve requirements on the quantity of base money held by depositories. This spliced chain index is numerically larger than the Board of Governors' measure, which excludes vault cash not used to satisfy statutory reserve requirements and Federal Reserve Bank deposits used to satisfy required clearing balance contracts; see Anderson and Rasche (1996a , 2001 , 2003 .
Monetary Services Index:
An index that measures the flow of monetary services received by households and firms from their holdings of liquid assets; see Anderson, Jones, and Nesmith (1997) . Indexes are shown for the assets included in M2, with additional data at research.stlouisfed.org/msi/index.html. 
to five alternative target inflation rates, π * = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 percent, where f t * is the implied federal funds rate, π t -1 is the previous period's inflation rate (PCE) measured on a year-over-year basis, y t -1 is the log of the previous period's level of real gross domestic product (GDP), and y t -1 P is the log of an estimate of the previous period's level of potential output. Potential Real GDP is estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Page 12: Velocity (for MZM and M2) equals the ratio of GDP, measured in current dollars, to the level of the monetary aggregate. MZM and M2 Own Rates are weighted averages of the rates received by households and firms on the assets included in the aggregates. Prior to 1982, the 3-month T-bill rates are secondary market yields. From 1982 forward, rates are 3-month constant maturity yields.
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